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CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE:
SOME CURRENT ISSUES
Terry v. Ohio and the Power of Police to Accost
Citizens Absent Probable Cause to Arrest: A Critical
Look at the Pennsylvania Experience
Joseph P. Caracappa*
Terry v. Ohio' and its companion cases2 gave police officials the
authority to detain and sometimes search, on less than probable
cause, individuals suspected of engaging in or about to engage in
criminal activity.' It has been a decade since Terry paved the way
for courts and citizens to see these street encounters for what they
really are: a unique species of police activity, serving a variety of
crime-related functions. 4
Terry was the Supreme Court's first foray into stop-and-frisk
cases, and the Court understandably made a conscious effort to
leave room for development. Thus, few specific guidelines can be
distilled from the cases. 5 Excepting the recent reversal, on certiorari
*

B.A., Pennsylvania State University (1973); J.D., Duquesne University (1977); Law

Clerk to Justice Louis L. Manderino, Associate Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
1977-1978; Associate, Jackson, Sullivan & Beckert, Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania.
1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. Decided the same day as Terry were Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New York, 392
U.S. 40 (1968). The Court disposed of Peters and Sibron together, although the cases had
little in common. For an encapsulation of the factual backgrounds of these three cases, as
well as the opinions of the Court, see LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. Rxv. 40, 47-50 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
LaFave].
3. The Court avoided this issue on at least two prior occasions. See Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
4. See 392 U.S. at 13 & n.9.
5. See note 2 supra.
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papers, of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Mimms,' only once has the Supreme Court given any flesh to the
bones of Terry.7 State courts, however, including Pennsylvania trial
and appellate courts, increasingly have been called on to assay the
legality of police responses in a variety of street encounters which
usually involve some degree of government encroachment on personal liberties. These police activities come before courts under
numerous labels, including "investigatory stop," "temporary seizure for investigation," "forcible stop," "stop-and-frisk," etc.
In establishing general guidelines for investigatory stops in Terry,
the Supreme Court did make clear that the fourth amendment is a
relevant limitation on the constitutionality of the practices, notwithstanding that police conduct stops short of a "technical arrest"
or a "full-blown search."'8 I am not at all certain that the Pennsylvania courts appreciate the implications of this constitutional limitation.
The fourth amendment, perhaps more than any other specific
limitation in the Bill of Rights, is profoundly anti-government. It
denies the government desired means, and at times concededly
efficient means, to obtain legitimate and laudable objectives.
Through the exclusionary rule, the fourth amendment may also
interdict a variety of police practices that could prevent incipient
crimes or solve completed crimes. The central meaning of the fourth
amendment is that "our society puts a premium on the sanctity of
individual freedom and security in the face of unwarranted government encroachments." 9 Thus, some tangible evidence must be suppressed, and possibly some convictions lost, because the framers of
our Constitution were willing to pay such a price for "the right to
be let alone."' 0 It is the judicial branch of our government which was
given the responsibility to safeguard this most fundamental of constitutional liberties.
In reading some of the recent Pennsylvania Supreme and Supe6. 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157 (1977), rev'd and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1978). See notes
118-23 and accompanying text infra.
7. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), discussed infra at text accompanying notes
33-39. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (Court interprets Terry
and Adams and applies principles enunciated there to the stopping of vehicles by the United
States Border Patrol).
8. 392 U.S. at 19.
9. Commonwealth v. Hall, 380 A.2d 1238, 1242 (Pa. 1977) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
10. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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rior Court decisions, one learns of a number of police practices
which, it seems to me, are in need of fourth amendment regulation.
Yet, on the authority of Terry, or Adams v. Williams" (the United
States Supreme Court's second major pronouncement in this area),
these practices have gone largly unregulated, at least from a judicial
standpoint. Many of these cases go beyond anything the Supreme
Court said in Terry or Adams, and some are difficult if not impossible to reconcile with those cases. These questionable extensions of
Terry and Adams are a testament to "the powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on [courts] to water
down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper
2
hand."1
Through an examination of, for the most part, Terry and Adams,
this article will briefly set forth what I believe is constitutionally
required to effect a "forcible stop" (seizure) of a citizen, what is
constitutionally required to forcibly stop and search (frisk) a citizen,
and correlatively, when the Constitution forbids a policeman to do
either or both. The article will then review Pennsylvania's experience with forcible street encounters, in light of that constitutional
analysis. After identifying the potential problems attending a
wholesale acceptance of "stop-and-frisk" or "investigatory seizure
for investigation," I suggest a means of fourth amendment regulation that will meaningfully restrain the police who have warmly
embraced, and fully utilized, the search and seizure techniques now
given judicial blessing.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENTS

Stopping suspicious individuals and sometimes frisking them for
weapons is not a new police practice; it is a time-honored law enforcement technique, 3 quite distinct from police activities such as
arrest and full search incident to an arrest." For years, however,
11. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). For a thorough analysis of the Adams decision, see The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAfv. L. REv. 50, 171-81 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term].
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13. See National Center of Police and Community Relations, Field Surveys V: A Report
of A Research Study Submitted to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice 327-36 (1967).
14. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1973) (discussing the difference
between a Terry stop and frisk and a search incident to an arrest). If probable cause to arrest
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these temporary seizures for investigation were argued before and
decided by the courts in terms of whether or not there had been a
lawful arrest. 5 One explanation for this phenomena was that forcible stops, or stops accompanied by a frisk, did not fit comfortably
within any extant legal pigeonhole. 6
When the stop-and-frisk cases came before the United States
Supreme Court in 1967, opponents, believing stop-and-frisk to be no
more than a beguiling phrase for oppressive police activity, urged
the Court to recognize only two categories of police-citizen street
encounters: either a citizen's freedom to walk away from the accosting officer was being restrained-for any length of time, to any
degree, or for any purpose-or it was not. 7 If the citizen was being
restrained, a fourth amendment "seizure" had taken place, and the
seizure was lawful only if the officer had probable cause"5 to believe
his suspect was guilty of a crime. If the person was not being restrained, there was no seizure and the officer could talk to the citizen as much as he pleased, upon any grounds or upon no grounds
at all-provided the citizen was willing to stop and listen.
Proponents of stop-and-frisk urged the Court to reject such a
monolithic model of the fourth amendment. They argued that the
police, in dealing with dangerous, rapidly unfolding situations on
city streets, "are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses,
graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess."' 9
Thus an officer should be permitted to merely question a citizen on
the street without cause, he should be permitted to briefly detain a
citizen and if need be, pat him down, upon "reasonable suspicion""
exists, a fortiori the police have grounds to stop and frisk. See Commonwealth v. White, 447
Pa. 331, 341 n.6, 290 A.2d 246, 252 n.6 (1972).
15. An excellent example is Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963),
a case easily amenable to a Terry analysis but decided on the ground of whether or not an
arrest had occurred. See generally Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Personsand Police Arrest Privileges in General,
51 J. Cram. L. 386, 390 (1960).
16. LaFave, supra note 2, at 43.
17. See 392 U.S. at 11. See also Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 56-57, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18. The Supreme Court's definition of probable cause in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964),
is the one most often relied upon by Pennsylvania courts in determining the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause to arrest* See Commonwealth v. Pinney, 378 A.2d 293, 29495 (Pa. 1977), and cases cited therein. No arrest without a warrant is legal unless there is
probable cause to make it. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Yocham, 375 A.2d 325, 329 (Pa. 1977).
19. 392 U.S. at 10.
20. The term "reasonable suspicion" was not actually used in Terry but has evolved into
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that criminal activity is afoot and that the officer's safety may be

endangered. Finally, he should be permitted 2to arrest and thoroughly search the citizen upon probable cause. '

The Supreme Court essentially adopted this "escalating set of
flexible responses." Its 1968 decisions, and principally Terry, are
generally read as recognizing three types of street encounters: mere
conversation or nonforcible questioning which the officer may
commence without particular reason;" "stops" or "forcible stops"
(seizures in fourth amendment nomenclature) which require reliable indicia of criminal activity, although something short of probable cause; and arrests, which require probable cause. " 1 These broad
categories, however, are deceptively simple. It was left to determine

when these different degrees of restraint were lawful police responses to a given set of circumstances.
Perhaps it is important to note what Terry did say in this regard
before turning to what the Court did not say. Terry held that a stopand-frisk did amount to a search and seizure and therefore was
subject to fourth amendment limitations, but, since a stop-and-frisk
was less intrusive than an arrest and search incidental thereto, less
justification would be required for it. The on-the-spot police response involved in the stop-and-frisk situation is not governed by
the probable cause standard of the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement. 2 Rather, the constitutional test is whether the search
and seizure is reasonable under all the circumstances.2
To give substance to the general limiting criterion of
the accepted nomenclature for the constitutional standard, a lesser standard than probable
cause, for police-citizen encounters not amounting to a full search or custodial arrest. See
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973); Commonwealth v. Murray, 460
Pa. 53, 61, 331 A.2d 414, 418 (1975).
21. See text accompanying note 90 infra; note 18 supra.
22. See United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62,67 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Commonwealth v. Jones,
378 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1533 (1978), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
23. See note 32 infra.
24. The Terry Court recognized that the practicalities of on-the-street law enforcement
made it necessary to carve out another exception to the fourth amendment's presumptive
warrant requirement. 392 U.S. at 20. For other exceptions, see Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90
H~Av. L. REv. 945, 980-81 n.221 (1977). For some of the effects of the proliferation of exceptions on the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rav. 349, 393-94 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam].
25. 392 U.S. at 19. See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 98 S.Ct. 330 (1978) (per curiam);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Commonwealth v. Timko, 380 A.2d 861,
863 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
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"reasonableness" in the context of stop-and-frisk, courts must balance the government interest in effective crime prevention against
the individual interest in freedom from unnecessary government
intrusion.26 The more serious intrusions-there are varying kinds of
searches and seizures-require increasing degrees of justification, a
point I will return to later.2 Similarly, a less compelling government
interest should dictate a more restricted response to a situation
which might arouse the "suspicions" of a policeman.
Applying this analysis to the facts before it in Terry, the Supreme
Court formulated a constitutional test, often recited in Pennsylvania decisions:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he
is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a'carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him.28

Hence, Terry holds that a police officer may conduct a carefully
circumscribed search of a person's outer clothing for weapons only
if the officer has a "reasonable suspicion"' that criminal activity is
afoot and a reasonable belief that the suspicius individual is armed
axnd dangerous. 0 So much for the unmuddied waters.
The Terry opinion focused only on the legality of a self-protective
search. It says very little, and nothing meaningful, about the consti26. 392 U.S. at 20-27. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
27. 392 U.S. at 17-18 n.15.
28. Id. at 30.
29. See note 20 supra.
30. A careful reading of Terry, in light of the evidence available to the Court as to the
effectiveness of stop-and-frisk as a crime-preventive measure, indicates that Terry cannot rest
on either of these requirements standing alone. The decision makes sense only because both
factors are present-the suspicion of criminal activity and reasonable belief that the suspect
is armed and dangerous. See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HAsv. L. Ray. 93, 181-83
(1968). Accord, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); United States v. Martin, 562
F.2d 673, 680 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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tutionality of the initial stop of a suspicious individual. The Court
explicitly declined to rule on the reasonableness of forcibly detaining the suspect, either before or after the frisk, for the additional
purpose of investigation or interrogation. 3 1 Among the unresolved
questions were: whether facts not amounting to probable cause
could justify an "investigatory seizure" or "forcible stop" short of
an arrest; what behavior by the police officer transforms a forcible
stop into an arrest requiring probable cause to effectuate it; and
perhaps most important, whether the constitutional standard for a
forcible stop is different, and if so in what respect, than the standard
for a stop-and-frisk.
Determining the proper constitutional test for forcible stops
presents several issues. Must there be articulable facts from which
it is reasonable to conclude that criminal activity is afoot and that
the person is armed and dangerous? Is simply a suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot enough or might a policeman forcibly detain any person he pleases so long as the person is not patted down
or otherwise searched? It seems the Terry Court avoided these
troublesome questions by assuming that a fourth amendment
seizure did not arise as long as an individual approached by an
officer did not resist detention, or the police officer was not forced
to exert his authority in any way.
This assumption was implicitly rejected by Justice Rehnquist in
the Supreme Court's next and to date last major opinion addressing
police-citizen street encounters, Adams v. Williams. " The Adams
standard for a self-protective frisk seems faithful to Terry.u Adams
recognized, however, that any on-the-street investigatory stop by
the police inevitably involves a restraint on the citizen's freedom to
walk away and therefore is a seizure subject to the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement.1 In a notably short opinion,
Justice Rehnquist read Terry to hold that a police officer may
31. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
32. The line between a "stop" and the sort of arrest that requires probable cause was left
unclear in the wake of Terry. See Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 104-05 (1969). Presumably, an arrest is any restriction of a citizen's freedom of movement which is more than "brief."
Compare Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1960), and Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 103 (1959), with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10, 26 (1968). See also United States v.
Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 69-71 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
33. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
34. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 11, at 174-75 n.17.
35. Compare id. at 171-74, with 407 U.S. at 146.
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briefly stop an individual when the officer reasonably believes the
individual is engaged in criminal activity and the exigencies of the
situation, such as the need to momentarily freeze things or ascertain
the suspect's identity, justify the stop.3" A fair paraphrase of the
Court's language in Adams is that, assuming exigent circumstances,
a police officer may lawfully stop a suspicious individual when he
reasonably believes "criminal activity is afoot"-the first half of the
Terry stop-and-frisk test.
Terry's additional requirement for a stop-and-frisk-that the
police reasonably believe the suspect is armed and dangerous-is
noticeably missing from at least this portion of Adams. 7 Neither
the United States Supreme Court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, however, has ever squarely held that in the absence of
reason to believe a person is armed and dangerous, the police may
forcibly stop that person for investigation or interrogation simply
because the police believe that person is engaged in criminal activity.3 Since Adams purported only to elaborate on and apply Terry,
there is no direct Supreme Court authority for interpreting the
fourth amendment to permit forcibly restraining citizens on the
street, on less than probable cause, if the officer has no reason to
believe his own safety or the safety of others is in jeopardy.
That is not to say that such a result does not fit nicely into the
reasoned analysis supporting the stop-and-frisk power first sanctioned in Terry. Briefly, that analysis proceeds as follows. The probable cause requirement for any arrest compromises the opposing
interests of the public in crime prevention and detection, and of
individuals in privacy and security. One factor in fashioning probable cause as the standard is the degree of imposition on the individual, including the full search incident to that arrest and subsequent
trip to the station house. Since a brief on-the-street seizure and
36. "A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." 407 U.S. at 146.
37. Adams' "brief stop" discussion, see note 36 supra, has been viewed as dicta by at least
one court. Commonwealth v. Benson, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 100, 107, 361 A.2d 695, 698 (1976).

Benson is technically correct. Adams held that under the circumstances, a Terry stop and
frisk was permissible. Therefore, language sanctioning a "brief stop" to identify a suspicious

individual, termed an "intermediate response," was unnecessary to the Court's holding.
What Justice Rehnquist was probably seeking to do was remove some of the sting from Terry's
requirement that there be a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and reason to believe
the suspect is armed and dangerous.
38. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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careful pat-down of one's outer clothing for weapons is less intrusive, less information is needed to make such a stop. Similarly, I
would argue, simply restraining a suspicious individual's freedom to
leave, until the officer can inquire into the suspicious circumstances, is an even slighter intrusion and requires even less justification.
Such a stop is far less conspicuous and less humilating than a frisk.
Thus, the officer need not be able to articulate facts which led to
his belief that the suspect was armed and dangerous. On the other
side of the reasonableness scale, prohibiting police from stopping
and merely questioning suspicious individuals when they reasonably suspect a crime is in the offing would greatly hamstring law
enforcement forces.
Terry and Adams together seem to establish that in appropriate
circumstances the fourth amendment allows a limited "search" or
"seizure" on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or
conduct a full search.39 Specifically, to stop and frisk, the police
must observe unusual conduct giving rise to a reasonable suspicion-something less than probable cause-that criminal activity is
afoot and that the person is both armed and dangerous. Forcible
restraint to investigate or interrogate requires that police reasonably
believe-again, have a "reasonable suspicion"-that criminal activity is afoot, and exigent circumstances must warrant the stop. Furthermore, where the government interest at stake is not compelling,
the intrusion on the freedom protected by the fourth amendment
must be commensurately lessened. Although the police in these
cases act without probable cause, i.e., on less reliable information,
these forcible street encounters are deemed reasonable within the
commands of the fourth amendment because of the "minimal intrusion" of a forcible stop. 0 The "brief stop" referred to in Adams
withstands constitutional muster precisely because it is brief."
With this skeletal framework supplied us by the Supreme Court,
Pennsylvania's experience with forcible street encounters can be
examined.
39.

At least this is how the Supreme Court has viewed its own work. Id. at 881.

40. Id.
41. See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Jennings,
468 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1972).
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PENNSYLVANIA CASES

A.

Stop and Frisk

It was not long before Pennsylvania courts were called on to interpret and apply the Supreme Court's stop-and-frisk decisions. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the first to be confronted with the
issue in Commonwealth v. Hicks. 2 In what one commentator labeled an "outrageous decision,"4 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
upheld Hicks' conviction without having the benefit of Terry or its
companion cases.44 Hicks was stopped and patted-down, similar to
the police response in Terry. Hicks, however, was simply walking
down the street; he remotely fit the description of a burglar the
police were looking for, but he was not acting in an unusual manner.
Since Hicks was stopped and frisked, Terry required that the police
have a reasonable belief that Hicks was engaged in criminal activity
and that he was armed and dangerous. Hicks was an easy case, since
obviously the police could harbor no such belief under the facts.
Thus, his seizure and the subsequent search were unlawful, and the
evidence seized should have been suppressed. The court's standard
for the police action under scrutiny followed Terry: A stop-andfrisk-a limited search and seizure-is lawful if the accosting officer
observes "unusual and suspicious behavior" which reasonably leads
him to conclude that criminal activity is afoot, and that the person
45
with whom he is dealing may be armed and dangerous.
In cases where a suspicious individual is seized and frisked, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has fairly consistently adhered to
Terry as interpreted by Hicks. 41 Like Hicks, many of the cases that
reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were easy. What I find
most disturbing in these decisions is that the Commonwealth
argued, and apparently believed, that Terry justified the police action in question. The Commonwealth has raised Terry in cases involving rummaging expeditions for drugs;" indiscriminate seizures
42. 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969).
43. LaFave, supra note 2, at 81 n.210.
44. See 434 Pa. at 157 n.2, 253 A.2d at 278 n.2.
45. Id. at 158-59, 253 A.2d at 279.
46. See Commonwealth v. Pinney, 378 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. Pegram,
450 Pa. 590, 301 A.2d 695 (1973); Commonwealth v. Pollard, 450 Pa. 138, 299 A.2d 233 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Reese, 437 Pa. 422, 263 A.2d 463 (1970). Cf. Commonwealth v. Murray,
441 Pa. 22, 25 n.1, 271 A.2d 500, 501 n.1 (1970).
47. Commonwealth v. Reece, 437 Pa. 422, 263 A.2d 463 (1970).
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of persons in no way acting unusual or suspicious;" stopping and
searching a citizen whose only suspicious activity was to drive past
a police car giving the officer an "unusual look;""9 and more typically, stopping and frisking a citizen who purportedly fits a general
description the police have of someone involved in a crime.5 In this
latter type of case, the prosecution usually concedes the police acted
without probable cause, but argues the police could violate the citizen's privacy because they had a suspicion the person was involved
in criminal activity. The ramifications of this frequently posited
argument will be discussed later.
At this point, suffice it to say Terry was not meant to be applied
in many of these cases. Terry was intended to free the police from
the rigid rule that prevented them from doing anything to a person
suspected of being about to commit or having committed a dangerous crime, no matter how impelling the need for swift action, unless
probable cause existed to arrest the individual. It was a recognition
that the realities of on-the-street law enforcement often require an
officer to act on information short of probable cause in order to
protect property and prevent physical harm to himself and others.
My consternation with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases
applying Terry is not the test formulated to assess the validity of a
search or seizure. Rather, it is that Terry has been cavalierly applied
to every conceivable police-citizen encounter and more importantly,
to every statutory crime, without the slightest discussion by the
court of the propriety or wisdom of such an extension.
The seriousness of the offense under investigation is one case-bycase variable which police and our courts cannot ignore. 51 To take
into account the seriousness of the offense does not require the use
of some new and intricate sliding scale approach to fourth amend48. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 450 Pa. 138, 299 A.2d 233 (1973).
49. Commonwealth v. Boyer. 455 Pa. 283, 314 A.2d 317 (1974).
50. Commonwealth v. Pinney, 378 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. Sams, 465 Pa.
323, 350 A.2d 788 (1976). I am now convinced there are prosecutors in this Commonwealth
that will argue Terry in almost any case involving a challenged seizure of evidence. In addition to the cases cited at notes 47-50, see Commonwealth v. Orwig, 375 A.2d 99 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1977) (arguing that uncovering drugs while forcibly stopping an automobile was justified
on ground that defendant had a bad muffler; police officer testified he did not stop defendant
for that reason); Commonwealth v. Brown, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 285, 365 A.2d 853 (1976)
(arguing that placing suspect in a police van for an indefinite period is a Terry/Adams "brief
stop" in order to maintain the status quo).
51. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 246-48
(1965).
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ment jurisprudence, subjecting each statutory offense to a different
probable cause or "reasonable suspicion" standard. Rather, it involves only the common sense recognition, implicit in Terry and its
sister cases,5" that murder, armed robbery, and the like, call for a
different police response than gambling or the possession or sale of
marijuana.5 3 The same police response might be "good police work"
in one instance, yet an unreasonable encroachment on personal freedoms in another. Unfortunately, I have not seen even an intimation
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that it has considered the seriousness of the offense as a possible limitation on the applicability
of Terry. This is especially disturbing since stops and "protective
searches" are often a pretext to look for drugs or other contraband. 5'
The result of ignoring the nature of the offense, including, for example, whether the officer acts to abort a crime risking violence, is
clear. The "reasonable suspicion" test, unquestionably a more lenient standard than probable cause,55 becomes an ever-available
investigatory power that can be implemented regardless of the context or type of criminal investigation underway. Terry simply did
not countenance such a power and should not be interpreted as
doing so.
I am not the first to advocate limiting the stop and search power
where probable cause is lacking to investigations of violent crime or
crimes involving the deprivation of property." In Adams, however,
52. See LaFave, supra note 2, at 58-59 (author points out that a comparison of Terry and
Sibron reveals that the Court was influenced by the nature of the crimes involved in the two
cases). See also Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 390-95.
53. See Justice Jackson's famous statement in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
183 (1949) (dissenting opinion), to the effect that he might uphold a roadblock if it was thrown
up to terminate a kidnapping, but not if it was to "salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch
a bootlegger."
Of the Terry Justices, only Justice Harlan directly confronted the "troublesome" question
of whether Terry's dictates control in cases involving suspected possession of narcotics. Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1969) (concurring opinion).
54. See Kuh, In-Field Interrogation:Stop, Question, Detention, and Frisk, 3 Cam. L.
BULL. 597, 604 (1967) (police "fishing expeditions" for narcotics could be justified as lawful
frisks for weapons by retrospective "minor surgery on the facts"); MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMEar PROCEDURE § 110.2, Commentary at 118 (Official Draft No. 1, 1972). Cf. Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 Gao. L.J. 507
(1971).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1976). Accord, United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612-13 (1977).
56. A number of distinguished commentators and judges have suggested such a limitation. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 888-90 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151-53 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Williams v.
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the United States Supreme Court may have implicitly rejected the
view that the stop and frisk should be limited according to the
nature of the crime under suspicion. Adams' failure even to address
the question, after it had been raised below by Judge Friendly and
urged by the dissenters,57 suggests the Court has no intention of
placing such a limitation on this police investigatory tool. Likewise,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's silence may indicate a similar
intent.58 The possibility of such a limitation, however, is certainly
not foreclosed by anything the United States Supreme Court has
said, and the issue at least deserves consideration.
My criticism of the Pennsylvania Superior Court's approach to
this relatively new area of fourth amendment law is more fundamental. To anyone who believes the amendment can be an effective
restraint on arbitrary or oppressive police behavior, a number of the
superior court's recent decisions are dismaying. Surely no one will
ever mistake the superior court of the seventies with the Warren
Court of the sixties. A brief discussion of a few of those disturbing
cases follows, not so much to support these conclusory statements,
but because the cases show some of the hard realities, and potential
for abuse, surrounding this new police authority warmly embraced
by law enforcement forces.
Commonwealth v. Stratton" involved an individual stopped and
frisked on a flimsy hunch that something criminal was afoot; the
superior court called it "good police practice." Around midnight,
the defendant was standing near the doorway of a laundromat, approximately ten feet from the street. He was not acting furtively in
any respect. When a police officer approached, the defendant decided to leave, walking away "at a fast pace." The defendant was
stopped and immediately frisked, whereupon the police found an
unloaded handgun. The defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed deadly weapon; subsequent investigation showed that the
laundromat door had not been tampered with.
Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., dissenting);

MODEL PENAL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2, Commentary at 118 (Official Draft No. 1, 1972); LaFave,

supra note 2, at 65-66; 43 ALI Proceedings 117 (1966) (remarks of Mr. Steinberg). See also
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 11, at 174-75 n.17 (discussing Justice Harlan's
position on this question).
57. See note 56 supra.
58. It is possible the issue has never been presented to the Court by a defendant seeking
suppression of certain evidence.
59. 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 91, 331 A.2d 741 (1974).
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This knee jerk policework, it is asserted, patently violated the
fourth amendment, running afoul of police activity sanctioned by
Terry, Adams, or any Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision interpreting those cases. Although the defendant was subjected to a
search, the superior court never discussed whether this police officer
had, or could have had, a reasonable belief that the defendant was
armed and dangerous. Indeed, the officer could harbor no such belief, nor could he harbor a reasonablesuspicion, based on articulable
facts, that criminal activity was afoot. Every citizen who merely
stops near a business establishment after it closes, cannot be
stopped and frisked without the slightest opportunity to explain
what he was doing there. The defendant might have been looking
for a friend, waiting to be picked up by someone, or merely stopping
to catch his breath.ss Of course, the officer could have stopped the
defendant and inquired into the defendant's reason for being where
he was;" but, it is quite another matter to forcibly stop and search
him. This police officer could have had no more than a vague hunch
that a crime had taken place or was about to take place-clearly
insufficient to justify this serious intrusion upon a fundamental
liberty.2 Mr. Stratton happened to be carrying a handgun. We do
not know how many other citizens this officer accosted on only a
hunch that something was wrong; the searches that turn up no
weapons or contraband do not reach the courts.
Commonwealth v. Anderson13 is a case with staggering implications. In Anderson, the police received an anonymous phone call
that a black male in a Philadelphia bar, named "Perry," was an
escapee from a drug rehabilitation center. A general description was
given. The police entered the bar, saw a man they thought fit the
description, and asked the man his name. When the defendant gave
60. Judge Hoffman, dissenting in Stratton, observed:
Surely, appellant's mere presence near a doorway on a public sidewalk does not give
rise to an inference that criminal activity is afoot. To sustain a "stop-and-frisk" on
these facts would mean that anyone who stopped to gaze into a store window or door
late at night would be susceptible to a search.
Id. at 97, 331 A.2d at 743 (dissenting opinion).
61. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 835,838 (Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533
(1978).
62. Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. 320, 311 A.2d 914 (1973), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, on very similar facts, that the police practice under review violated the fourth amendment. Jeffries predated Stratton, and the two cases cannot be meaningfully distinguished.
63. 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 360 A.2d 739 (1976).
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a name other than Perry,"4 the police officer "told [the defendant]
to stand . . . and grabbed the pocket of [the defendant's] inner
jacket and felt what he thought to be a gun." 5 Anderson was carrying a small pistol, and was eventually convicted of various firearms
offenses. The superior court refused to suppress the gun because
"the officer was certainly justified in conducting a quick 'frisk' of
the suspect to determine if he was in any physical danger.""
To my thinking, the only certainty here was that the police action
was a flagrant violation of a citizen's fourth amendment rights. The
tip had absolutely no indicia of reliability, and although it has been
argued that the Supreme Court in Adams relaxed the informant
reliability standard for street encounters, 7 the Adams Court asserted that "[s]ome tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would . . .warrant no police response."" Nothing in Adams,
5 or any case decided by the
Terry,"
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
justified a forcible stop and search of this citizen. There was nothing
to give the police a reasonablesuspicion that criminal activity was
afoot, let alone reason to believe Anderson was armed and dangerous (the anonymous informant did not say Anderson was armed).
Under these circumstances, i.e., absent some indication of criminal
activity, police officers in this commonwealth have no authority to
encroach on a citizen's bodily integrity as did these police.
Anderson, it would appear, facilitates legal harrassment of one
citizen by another. Simply informing the police that an individual
has escaped from somewhere, whether or not true, would authorize
64. The defendant did not give the police his correct name. Of course, even if he had given
the police his real name (Gregory Anderson), it would have been inconsistent with the name
supplied by the anonymous caller (Perry). Nonetheless, President Judge Watkins stated:
"[the police] would have been remiss in their duty if they had accepted at face value the
defendant's bold assertion that he was a person other than the one for whom they were
looking." Id. at 4, 360 A.2d at 741.
65. Id. at 3, 360 A.2d at 740.
66. Id.
67. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 11, at 177-80.
68. 407 U.S. at 147.
69. The Anderson court did not cite Terry or Adams. The court never found that the
defendant was under arrest, however, nor that there was probable cause to arrest him. Hence,
Terry and Adams are the only extant legal precedent, at least as the Supreme Court has
interpreted the fourth amendment, for the search and seizure that took place in this case.
The court avoided this fact by formulating a "probable cause to 'pat down' " standard, an
amalgam of the principles of stop-and-frisk and probable cause to arrest. To my knowledge,
this standard, while raising interesting possibilities, is unknown to this country's fourth
amendment jurisprudence.
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the police to frisk that individual. If the individual happens to carry
a handgun for self protection, conviction for a firearm offense may
result. In any event, it is alarming to see a court in this commonwealth, whose primary responsibility and duty it is to protect constitutional rights,' to countenance this arbitrary police conduct which
can only, in the long run, breed contempt for police authority.'
Commonwealth v. Mimms7 2 presents another example of unfettered police discretion which the superior court allowed to go unchecked, perhaps because of the "pressures" that bear on courts to
water down constitutional rights in the name of law enforcement.
At nine o'clock in the morning, a black citizen was driving his car
with an expired license plate. Police officers stopped the car to issue
a traffic summons, and the citizen was "asked" to step out of the
car and produce his operator's license. Once the citizen was outside
of the car, the police noticed a bulge under his jacket. The citizen
was immediately frisked and the bulge turned out to be a handgun.
Since the defendant's actions gave the police no reason to believe
this was anything more than a routine traffic violation, the question
becomes: which drivers will be ordered out of their cars when they
commit traffic violations, with their person carefully reconnoitered
for so-called "bulges" which purportedly justify a search? The answer seems plain enough. Whether I am subjected to these indignities, or sent on my way with a pink slip or a warning, will often
depend on my obsequiousness, the length of my hair, style of my
dress, or color of my skin.
This seems to me not only wrong, but intolerable. Such untrammelled discretion to seize and search contravenes the fourth amendment, for arbitrary searches and seizures are unreasonable searches
and seizures.73 The superior court in Mimms asserted that Terry
"encouraged" searches such as the one that took place in Mimms,
for the protection of law enforcement officers. This is just not so, and
moreover, that statement cannot be reconciled with the fourth
amendment as I understand it. A police officer cannot search every
70. Commonwealth v. Hall, 380 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. 1977) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
71. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469-85 (1928) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.,
dissenting) (uneven and illegal law enforcement breeds contempt for the law).
72. 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 486, 335 A.2d.516 (1975), rev'd, 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157 (1977),
rev'd and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1978) (per curiam). The United States Supeme Court's
disposition of Mimms is discussed infra at notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
73. Ortiz v. United States, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); United States v. United States

District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972).
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citizen he has contact with and who has a bulge somewhere on his
or her person.' Every bulge is not a gun that is ready to be used on
the officer. An officer who approaches a citizen on the street to ask
the citizen for a match cannot, upon noticing a lump in the citizen's
breast pocket, simply frisk the citizen on the ground his safety may
be endangered. Nor does the fourth amendment permit a search if
a policeman notices the same bulge while calling a citizen over to
reprimand him or her for jaywalking. As Terry makes manifestly
clear, one can lawfully be frisked (searched) only when that person's
actions give an officer a reasonable belief that the person is armed
and dangerous, presenting a danger to the officer whose duty it is
to investigate the suspicious conduct he has become aware of. Lip
service aside,75 the superior court does not seem to appreciate the
fact that frisks cannot be conducted as a matter of course whenever
a police officer, while executing his duties, encounters a citizen.76
The officer must have reason to believe that his personal safety may
be jeopardized unless he conducts a pat-down to disarm the person
he is detaining.
Justice Jackson once termed the Bill of Rights "the maximum
restrictions upon the power of organized society over the individual
that are compatible with the maintenance of organized society itself." I believe Terry's carefully delimited exception to the requirement of probable cause is consistent with that view.78 However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's carte blanche extension of Terry to
74. Although I would have thought this to be an indisputable fourth amendment principle, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Union Pac. R.R. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), this may now be open to question. See Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting from per curiam reversal and
remand).
75. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Galadyna, 375 A.2d 69, 72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
76. In addition to Mimms, see Commonwealth v. Houser, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 80,364 A.2d
459 (1976), upholding a search where the police officer frisked the defendant whose pocket
had a bulge in it. The officer testified at the suppression hearing: "[hie had a big bulge in
his pocket. So I just searched him to see if it was a weapon." Id. at 86 n.3, 364 A.2d at 462
n.3 (Spaeth, J., dissenting). See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 285, 365
A.2d 853 (1976); Commonwealth v. Stratton, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 91, 331 A.2d 741 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Mobley, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 254, 281 A.2d 659 (1971) (Hoffman, J., dissenting from per curiam affirmance). Mobley seems irreconcilable with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), Terry's companion case.
77. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
78. The Supreme Court continues to characterize Terry as involving an affirmative,
"narrowly focused intrusion" into individual privacy during the course of a criminal investigation. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977). Accord, Commonwealth v. Wilder, 461
Pa. 597, 600 n.3, 337 A.2d 564, 566 n.3 (1975).
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the diverse types of encounters between citizen and police and to
every statutory crime, and the superior court's willingness to uphold
increasing varieties of police conduct whose constitutionality is suspect, are testaments to the "powerful hydraulic pressures, ' 7 identified by Justice Douglas, weighing on courts to debase the fourth
amendment and not resolutely invoke it to deter unlawful executive
behavior. Recent cases addressing the constitutionality of the initial
investigatory or forcible stop do nothing to allay my uneasiness that
the balance struck in Terry is now heavily weighted in favor of the
government.
B.

The Forcible Stop for Investigation or Interrogation

Considering the numerous issues facing the Court in Terry, it is
understandable that the Court chose not to decide whether, and
under what circumstances, facts not amounting to probable cause
could justify an "investigative seizure," short of an arrest, in order
to examine a situation that aroused the officer's suspicions.80 There
is now little doubt that such a forcible stop can be effectuated on
less than probable cause. 8 Still unclear, however, is when such a
stop is constitutionally permissible, and what limitations the fourth
amendment imposes on the nature of the stop. In other words, unlike stop-and-frisk, our courts have not articulated standards by
which to judge the constitutionality of an investigatory or forcible
stop. This is troubling when one considers Justice Harlan's correct
observation in Terry that the officer's right to stop should be resolved before any other questions are reached."2
79. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. See 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v.
Magda, 547 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976); Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978).
82. [Ihf the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with
a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter,
to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a
person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm
such a person for his own protection he must first have a right not to avoid him but to
be in his presence. That right must be more than the liberty (again, possessed by every
citizen) to address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has
an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit
to a frisk for the questioner's protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the right
to frisk in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a
suspected crime.
392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Justice Harlan's view was
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure to address this threshold issue is unfortunate, since lawyers and police are as much in
need of guidance in this area as in the stop-and-frisk cases. And
there is much to lend guidance on. One obvious problem I have
already mentioned: at what point does the stop turn into an arrest,
thus requiring probable cause to make it lawful?81 For example, does
the "stop" become an arrest when the officer has to draw his gun
to prevent the citizen from leaving?" The court has only told us that
whether a forcible stop or an arrest has taken place, does not depend
on the actions of the accosting officer but on what a reasonable
person would think the officer was doing-forcibly detaining the
person or arresting the person. 5 Other questions largely unanswered, and in genuine need of answering, include what weight the
officer can give to the suspect's refusal to answer questions, since a
citizen has the right to remain silent if he so chooses. At what point
does a police response become constitutionally unacceptable because the "brief" stop is no longer brief?,8 And overshadowing these
specific trouble spots is a more important question: what potential
does this police power have to water down, if not inter, probable
cause as an effective (because understood by the police) buffer between citizen and state?
That brings us to the more basic question of standards. There are
strong indications, although no direct holdings, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided to accept, as a constitutional
standard for an investigatory stop, the first half of the Terry standard for a stop and frisk. That is, a police officer may forcibly seize
a person for purposes of investigation and/or detention if the officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
that criminal activity is afoot.8 7 As I posited earlier, the most peradopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in Adams without discussion. See 407 U.S. at
147.
83. See note 32 supra.
84. See United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1977) (no).
85. Compare Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977) (forcible stop), with Commonwealth v. Richards, 458 Pa. 455, 327 A.2d 63 (1974) (arrest) and Commonwealth v.
Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304, cert. denied,'375 U.S. 910 (1963) (same).
86. See, e.g., cases cited at note 41 supra.
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53, 61-63, 331 A.2d 414, 418-19 (1975); Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590,
301 A.2d 695 (1973). Pegram probably comes closest to so holding. Pegram had been stopped
and frisked, so that both Terry's requirements (suspicion of criminal activity and belief that
suspect is armed and dangerous) had to be satisfied. In holding there were no facts from which
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suasive rationale for the police power sanctioned in Terry is amenable to such a test, discarding the further requirement that the officer
believe the suspect is armed and dangerous. The police must have,
however, at a constitutional minimum, a "reasonable suspicion" 's
of impending criminal activity.
Assuming the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted this
standard for reviewing investigatory stops, presumably the court
would give some indication of what constitutes a "reasonable suspicion." Not so. About all we know is that "reasonable suspicion" is
9
somewhere between an "inarticulate hunch"" and the level of information that would give an officer probable cause to arrest: facts and
circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, that would be sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or
was committing an offense. 0
Terry itself is of little help in determining when an officer's initial
stop of a citizen is constitutionally justified." Terry's deficiency in
this regard is not a secret. Soon after the Court's decision in that
it could be inferred Pegram was armed and dangerous, the court offered this observation:
Assuming that the officers did observe "unusual conduct" which might reasonably
have led them to conclude, in light of their experience, that criminal activity may have
been afoot, thus justifying the "stop", no such conduct was observed which would lead
to the conclusion that appellant was either "armed or presently dangerous.'
450 Pa. at 595, 301 A.2d at 698 (emphasis added). Jones arguably comes close to such a
holding. In discussing a "stop for investigatory purposes," an ellipse is used to delete Terry's
armed and dangerous requirement, leaving the first half of the Terry standard as the standard
for forcible stops. 378 A.2d at 840. An extraneous reference to a stop "in this context" beclouds
the issue, however, and such a backdoor tactic as the use of an ellipse should not be considered a definitive "holding" on this important fourth amendment issue. See also Commonwealth v. Boyer, 455 Pa. 283, 286, 314 A.2d 317, 318 (1974), using a similar tactic in analyzing
the stop of a motor vehicle.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has now met the issue head-on and squarely held that a
forcible stop, unlike a stop and frisk, requires only a "reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot." Commonwealth v. Galadyna, 375 A.2d 69, 72 (1977). The court cited
Pegram as authority for its decision.
88. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53, 61-63, 331 A.2d 414, 418-19 (1975).
89. 392 U.S. at 22. See also United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
90. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Commonwealth v. Pinney, 378 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1977);
Commonwealth v. Levesque, 469 Pa. 118, 364 A.2d 932 (1976).
91. Terry again offers only the most general limiting criterion. In reviewing an officer's
grounds for suspicion, courts are to use an objective standard: "would the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a [person) of reasonable
caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" 392 U.S. at 21-22. Mere good
faith on the part of the accosting officer is not enough. Id. at 22.
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case, Professor LaFave observed that "it is clear that in the years
ahead one of the major tasks of the courts will be to flesh out the
evidentiary standards for temporary investigative seizures."9 Those
of us who would like to see the courts in this jurisdiction do so are
still waiting. I cannot overemphasize the necessity of articulating
definite standards if police are to have reasonably clear guidelines
as to what they may do under what circumstances. Only when that
happens will the chances of unconstitutional seizures be diminished. For the Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely to extract half
the Terry stop-and-frisk standard as the test for the initial stop,
and adopt the legal construct "reasonable suspicion" without giving
content to that largely undefined term, is not the kind of handiwork
that gives significant protection to fourth amendment rights.
Commonwealth v. Mackie 3 presented an excellent vehicle for the
supreme court to define the scope of police authority in investigatory stops. In mid-afternooh in a "high crime area,"94 an officer
observed the defendant carrying an uncased television set and a pair
of field glasses. The officer approached the defendant and asked him
a few questions; the officer was dissatisfied with the answers given
by the defendant and arrested him. The items proved to be stolen.
Four members of the court thought the officer did not have probable
cause for the arrest, hence the evidence should have been suppressed. Conceding that the officer's observations may have given
rise to "good faith suspicions," Justice Manderino's majority opinion stated in dicta that such suspicions "may have justified '[a]
brief stop' of the citizen 'inorder to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily . . . . ,92. LaFave, supra note 2, at 67.
93. 456 Pa. 372, 320 A.2d 842 (1974).
94. To forcibly stop a citizen, a police officer must be able to point to articulable facts
which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Yet another unresolved question in Pennsylvania is whether an area's reputation as a "high crime area" is an
articulable fact which, combined with other factors, might justify a forcible stop. See Commonwealth v. Pollard, 450 Pa. 138, 299 A.2d 233 (1973) (if sole reason for stop is area's
reputation as a high crime area, insufficient); Commonwealth v. Galadyna, 375 A.2d 69, 73
n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (area's reputation for crime can be considered with other factors).
See also United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 758, 763-64 (2d Cir. 1976) (majority and
dissenting opinions) (disagreeing on the weight to be accorded this "fact"). Another consideration is that absent empirical data, it is often only the police officer's word in that an area is
one of high crime. This is precisely what occurred in Mackie.
95. 456 Pa. at 375, 320 A.2d at 844, citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)
(emphasis in Mackie).
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What the majority apparently overlooked was that the officer's
response was a brief stop for detention and interrogation-an investigatory stop. The officer did not decide to arrest the defendant until
the defendant's answers proved unsatisfactory. If the court thought
that the officer's suspicions, apart from any questioning of the defendant, did not rise to the level of a "reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot," then the dicta that an Adams stop
would have been proper is wrong. The emphasis in the court's dicta
on the words "brief" and "momentarily" suggests the court might
have held that the forcible stop was unacceptably long. Yet the stop
was only long enough to allow the officer to address a number of
questions to the defendant. I doubt that the supreme court is taking
the position that police, during the course of a justified forcible stop,
cannot make a valid arrest from information obtained after the
initial stop which gives the officer probable cause to believe the
suspect was committing or had committed a crime."
Of course, if the Commonwealth argued only the probable cause
question and never raised the forcible stop issue, and it appears
from the majority opinion that the forcible stop issue was not raised,
the court was correct in not making this bifurcated inquiry. Nonetheless, the police response in this case is best analyzed by such an
approach: first, was there justification for the initial stop, and second, if so, did the police then obtain sufficient information to justify
an arrest. By not approaching the case from this perspective, the
court missed an opportunity to clarify when Pennsylvania police can
lawfully stop citizens on the street because of a "reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity is at hand.
The court has had other opportunities to consider the constitutional grounds for the initial seizure, the most recent being
Commonwealth v. Jones. 7 The Jones opinion, however, focuses on
when a forcible stop occurs and thus when the fourth amendment
becomes relevant in assaying the legality of the seizure. 8 One brief,
96. See United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977); LaFave, supra note
2, at 77.
97. 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978). See also Commonwealth
v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53, 331 A.2d 414 (1975). Dicta in Murray stated that a "reasonable
suspicion" that criminal activity is afoot would justify a stop of an automobile. No mention
was made of the type of factors that would give rise to such a suspicion. See id. at 61-63, 331
A.2d 418-19. Compare with Murray, United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 878-80 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), which also discusses investigative stops of automobiles.
98. Terry held that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person" and the fourth amendment requires that
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unenlightening paragraph addresses the grounds for effectuating the
forcible stop, finding that there were no facts to support a reasonable conclusion that criminal activity was afoot. 9
I believe that the grounds for the initial stop can be set forth as
precisely and objectively as the grounds for a warrantless arrest
(probable cause).100 Professor LaFave argued convincingly that the
courts are capable of such a feat, 0' and the United States Supreme
Court proved him right in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.0 2 In
Brignoni-Ponce, the Court examined the United States Border Patrol's stopping of automobiles near the Mexican border to check for
illegal aliens. The court held that the Border Patrol must have at
least a "reasonable suspicion" that a vehicle contains aliens who are
illegally in the country. 01 3 Anything less would violate the fourth
amendment.
The important point is that the Court did not stop there. It did
not simply announce that Mexican ancestry alone would not support a reasonable suspicion of illegal entry into the country. The
Court carefully canvassed the "factors [that] may be taken into
account in deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a
car in the border area."'0 4 United States Border Patrol officers now
have guidelines as to when a reviewing court will find this type of
seizure reasonable as required by the fourth amendment.' 5 The
result: stops such as the one that occurred in Brignoni-Ponce, in
which constitutional rights were abridged, will occur less frequently
if at all.
the seizure be reasonable. 392 U.S. at 16. Jones determined that this "seizure" occurs when,
"considering all the facts and circumstances evidencing an exercise of force, 'a reasonable
man, innocent of any crime, would have thought [he was being restrained] had he been in
the defendant's shoes.' " 378 A.2d at 840, citing United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp.
324, 328 (D.D.C. 1965).
99. 378 A.2d at 840-41.
100. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454
Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973).
101. LaFave, supra note 2, at 62-84.
102. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
103. Id. at 882. Cf. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
104. 422 U.S. at 884. See id. at 884-85 for the factors a Border Patrol officer may consider
in deciding whether there exists sufficient cause to stop a vehicle suspected of transporting
illegal aliens.
105. Justice Douglas, concurring, was dismayed that the majority specified the factors to
be considered without explaining what combination of those factors were necessary to satisfy
the suspicion test. Id. at 890 (concurring opinion). For an example of a court struggling with
the decision in Brignoni-Ponce,see United States v. Escamilla, 560 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1977).
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The need for similar action by our own appellate courts was crystallized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision in
Commonwealth v. Hall.'"' What Hall squarely presented to the supreme court justices was the police practice, common in larger cities, of systematic harassment of young nonwhite citizens on only
the slightest suspicion of improper conduct.'"7 In the words of Professor Amsterdam, "[u]nless one takes a very middle-class white
view of life, here is a practice that cries out for some sort of fourth
amendment regulation."' ' Five members of our supreme court
failed to see the need for fourth amendment regulation and incredibly, the majority never even mentioned the fourth amendment in
disposing of the case. ' "'
Hall was standing on a corner in Pittsburgh conversing with two
male companions when three plainclothes police officers, driving on
the opposite side of the street, spotted the three. The officers immediately made a U-turn, double-parked the police car in front of the
men and exited the car "with the express intention to confront the
[three] individuals.""10 When the three officers got within ten feet
of Hall, he allegedly dropped a bag at his feet."' The bag contained
heroin, and a subsequent search of Hall turned up marijuana. The
106. 380 A.2d 1238 (Pa. 1977). See also Commonwealth v. Greber & Gullick, 385 A.2d 1313
(Pa. 1978) (plurality opinion), in which Justice Manderino, speaking for only two members
of the court, found insufficient basis for a Terry stop, where the appellees were observed
exchanging a bag in a bowling alley parking lot. The opinion for the court relied on Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973), a case involving the existence vel non of
probable cause, but not expounding on what observations by the police officers would have
justified a forcible stop of appellees. The opinion stated only that "[w]hether an officer
should briefly detain a citizen for purposes of investigating suspected criminal activity will,
of course, depend on the facts and circumstances of each use." 385 A.2d at 1316. Justice
Roberts, concurring, saw no need to discuss Terry, since he found sufficient evidence to
support the suppression court's finding that appellees were arrested when police officers
blocked their egrees from the parking lot. Since the Commonwealth conceded that probable
cause was lacking at that time, the arrest was unlawful and the evidence had to be suppressed.
107. See sources cited in Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 457 n.283.
108. Id. at 405 (footnotes omitted).
109. Justice Nix did not participate in Hall. Only Justice Manderino dissented. He interpreted Terry and Adams to permit forcible stops of citizens, on less' than probable cause, only
when the police have reason to believe the suspect is engaging in criminal activity. In his view,
the officers were effectuating a forcible stop, and since Hall's behavior preceding the stop was
completely innocent, his seizure was unlawful. 380 A.2d at 1242-43.
110. Id. at 1240.
111. Instances of defendants who allegedly "drop" contraband before they are searched
raise serious credibility questions. See Note, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A
New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507 (1971).
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suppression court, best able to resolve conflicting testimony and
adjudge credibility, determined that the officers, in effect,
"surrounded" Hall, and that, because of their threatening actions
which restricted Hall's freedom to walk away, Hall dropped the
bag."' The evidence was suppressed on the ground the police activity was coercive.
The supreme court was willing to assume Hall could reasonably
have concluded that the men who exited the car to "confront" him
were police officers. The court conceded there was no probable cause
to arrest Hall and there was nothing to give the police reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. It is clear, therefore, that
any forcible stop of Hall was illegal. The court nonetheless refused
to invalidate this arbitrary police conduct by rejecting the suppression court's findings, and stating that Hall could not have reasonably believed the officers were attempting a forcible stop."13 Since no
forcible stop had occurred, the fourth amendment was simply not
applicable and Hall's constitutional rights were not violated.
I think Justice Manderino's dissent in unassailable. In his view,
the majority strained reality to find that no forcible stop was taking
place."' A reasonable person who sees three men in a car make a
U-turn in front of him, and who watches the men exit the car and
come within ten feet, intending to confront him, is going to believe
his freedom to walk away is no longer unfettered and he had better
cooperate with these menacing individuals. Under Commonwealth
v. Jones, 5 a forcible stop had been effectuated and absent a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the fourth amendment was violated. So much for the particular facts of Hall; the case is alarming
for much more fundamental reasons.
There is little dispute that the fourth amendment's requirements
seek to limit police invasions of privacy to likely criminals, in effect,
separating likely criminals from the rest of society."' Putting aside
exactly when a forcible stop occurs (which depends on the reasonable beliefs of a hypothetical innocent citizen), I think it clear that
the type of police activity involved in Hall does nothing to further
112. 380 A.2d at 1240, quoting from Judge Spaeth's dissenting opinion in the superior
court which in turn quotes from the notes of the suppression hearing.
113. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533
(1978).
114. 380 A.2d at 1242 (dissenting opinion).
115. 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977). See note 98 supra.
116. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
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that underlying policy. It is inconceivable that the fourth amendment does not even deserve mention in a case like Hall. Our courts
have the "primary responsibility and duty of giving force and effect
to constitutional liberties.""' 7 Unless the fourth amendment is read
as putting a premium on the value of personal privacy and security
in the face of unwarranted government encroachment, it is difficult
to imagine what the amendment can mean. It is hard to read
Commonwealth v. Hall as respecting the sanctity of those values.
Rather, the decision subverts those interests, not by stressing the
safety of the officer or the need to protect private property, but by
weighing the societal cost in lost convictions and elevating that
interest above the individual's interest in a free society.
The difference in emphasis is significant. At least it makes the
United States Supreme Court's disposition of Commonwealth v.
Mimms" 1 more palatable. Mimms, as previously discussed, involved the police practice of ordering drivers stopped for routine
traffic violations to exit their vehicles. When Mimms was ordered
out of his car, a bulge was "noticed" under his jacket. He was
frisked, a weapon was discovered, and Mimms was convicted of
firearms' offenses.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing the superior court,",
held that this indiscriminate police practice procedure violated the
fouth amendment. 20 The court implied that had the officer been
able to point to "objective observable facts to support a suspicion
that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the vehicle
posed a threat to police safety," this stop and subsequent frisk
would have withstood constitutional analysis.'2 ' Since Mimms had
done nothing to arouse the officer's suspicions, the interference with
his bodily integrity was unlawful.
On nothing more than certiorari papers, the Supreme Court disa117. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 870 (1960).
118. 98 S. Ct. 330 (1978), rev'g and remanding, 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157 (1977). For
commentary on Mimms' possibly harmful effect on police-community relations see Dow,
Police Behavior and Community Relations-A CriticalAnalysis of Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
49 PA. B.A.Q. 261 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dow].
119. See notes 72-76 and accompanying text supra.
120. 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157 (1977). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not have to
reach the issue of whether the frisk of Mimms was proper. The superior court upheld the frisk
as a protective measure, and in a brief concluding paragraph, the United States Supreme
Court agreed. It concluded that the pat down was reasonable under the circumstances,
purportedly on the authority of Terry. 98 S. Ct. at 334.
121. 471 Pa. at 552, 370 A.2d at 1160.
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greed with Justice Pomeroy's analysis, and in a per curiam order,
reversed and remanded the case to the Pennsylvania court. Important here is the Court's heavy reliance on a perceived threat to
police officers' safety, justifying the "de minimus" intrusion of having an already stopped driver get out of the car. 2 ' Largely because
of the state interest in the safety of its law enforcement forces, such
a procedure was reasonable under all the circumstances and hence
did not contravene the fourth amendment.2 3 There was no indication in Hall, however, that these officer's safety was in any way
endangered, and the intrusion occasioned by their actions could
hardly be termed de minimus.
That Commonwealth v. Hall portends a decreased appreciation
by the Pennsylvania court of the central meaning of the fourth
amendment is perhaps demonstrated by the two concluding sentences in the majority opinion: "There is nothing in the Constitution
which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on
the streets. A fortiori, a policeman may approach a citizen on the
streets in order to put himself in a position to address those questions to the citizen."'2 4 That tidy little syllogism, while no doubt
122. 98 S. Ct. at 333. One of the points of Justice Stevens' dissent was his belief that the
majority's factual assumption about police safety was "dubious at best." Id. at 337 (dissenting opinion).
123. I do not mean to imply that I agree with the result in Mimms, for the case has
portentous implications. The police officer in Mimms had no reason to suspect foul play from
Mimms at the time of this particular stop (he was nonetheless frisked when the officer noticed
a bulge). Ordinarily, then, Mimms' seizure (there was no question that ordering someone to
get out of his or her car constitutes a fourth amendment seizure) would be an unlawful one.
Arguably, the danger engendered when the police stop a driver who forgot to renew his
automobile registration is not greater than any other seemingly innocuous police-citizen
encounter. Mimms may be authority for allowing police officers, whenever their duties require
them to be face-to-face with a citizen, to frisk that person, notwithstanding the absence of
suspicious behavior, whenever the officer notices a "bulge" anywhere on the citizen's person.
It is not a big step to allow a frisk of a citizen coversing with the officer who has a hand in
his or her coat pocket, or to allow the quick search of a woman's purse which the officer
believes is inordinately bulky. I have already expressed the view that such a result cannot be
reconciled with the fourth amendment. See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra. Cf. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (relevant portion appears at note
82 supra.).
Of course, there remains the issue of the initial order to exit the vehicle. Again, whether or
not a person is ordered to get out of the car will depend on the length of one's hair,. the color
of one's skin, the style and cost of one's car, or the mode of one's dress. I am not persuaded
that the rules applicable to all street encounters should not be applicable to the situation in
Mimms. It is enough that if a driver gives a policeman any reason to believe something is
afoot, or that the officer's safety may in any way be endangered, that person can be ordered
out of the car so as to be in the full view of the officer. See Dow, supra note 118, at 267.
124. 380 A.2d at 1241-42 (quotations and footnotes omitted).
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true in certain situations, requires some significant qualification. A
police officer cannot approach any citizen with revolver drawn or
night stick brandished in order to freeze the situation so that questions can be addressed to a citizen.'25 A police officer would put
himself in a position to direct questions to a citizen sitting in a car
by blocking the car's egress With the police vehicle; yet such a seizure, 28 without some legally cognizable basis for it, would violate
the fourth amendment. Likewise a police officer cannot order a
citizen simply walking across the street to "stand where you are"
until the officer "put[s] himself in a position" to interrogate the
citizen. The fourth amendment withholds such authority from police officers. The Concluding sentences of Hall are only correct where
the citizen is not subjected to a show of authority and is willing to
listen to the officery 7 or, where the citizen is engaging in unusual
behavior which gives the officer reason to believe the citizen was
engaged in criminal behavior. The principle was ignored in Hall
solely to uphold his conviction, and more alarmingly, in a case
which portrayed a police practice totally repugnant to the fourth
amendment proscription of arbitrary and unreasonable seizures and
2
searches.1 1
III.

LOOKING AHEAD

Constitutional limitations on police invasions of personal privacy,
on less than probable cause, have had ten years to develop. We have
held the line fairly well when the challenged police response to a
situation is a stop-and-frisk which uncovers some evidence of illegality. Although the quantum of information that rises to the level
of a reasonable suspicion remains largely undefined, it is clear there
must be unusual behavior on the part of a suspect that gives the
police reason to believe criminal activity is afoot and that the person
is armed and dangerous.12 If the courts remain unwilling to limit
Terry to violent crimes and crimes involving property rights, they
125. But see note 123 supra.
126. See Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973). For a discussion
of investigatory stops of automobiles, see 1975-76 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 38 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 240-43 (1977).
127. See 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
128. See cases cited at note 73 supra.
129. Commonwealth v. Pinney, 378 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. Purnell, 241
Pa. Super Ct. 230, 360 A.2d 737 (1976).
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should nonetheless remain faithful to this standard; even Sibron v.
New York, 30 a case involving the suspected possession of narcotics,
requires that the officer have reason to believe the suspect is armed
and dangerous.
The battles that are still to be fought will involve the initial
investigatory seizure. A wholesale acceptance of such a general
police power would, admittedly, provide for those charged with
overseeing our criminal laws, an efficient means of crime detection
and law enforcement. That, however, should not be the only consideration.' 3' Our courts must be careful in countenancing such a
power and structuring its limitations; its potential to erode fourth
amendment liberties is, I hope at this point, obvious. Less and less
frequently will the police need to justify warrantless searches and
seizures by establishing probable cause for the arrest and the search
will thus be incident to the lawful arrest.' 31 When probable cause is
doubtful, or it is clear there was no probable cause to seize or arrest,
the argument will be that there was at least a "reasonable suspicion" to forcibly stop the individual and investigate further. At this
point, the police will argue that the officer observed circumstances
that gave him probable cause to effectuate a graduated response, an
arrest. 33 Forcible stops will not be confined to those situations where
exigent circumstances impelled such a stop. In short, "investigatory
seizure" has enormous potential to circumvent indirectly the concept of probable cause that has been deeply imbedded in this country's fourth amendment jurisprudence as an insulator against unwarranted government invasion of personal privacy. 34 The contexts
in which this power is available should therefore be carefully cabined, with the utmost solicitude for this interest.
130. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Federal courts are uniform that Sibron, no less than Terry,
requires that there exist facts which give rise to a reasonable belief that the individual
confronted is armed and dangerous. See, e.g., United States v. Thorpe, 526 F.2d 326, 328 (5th
Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Rosario, 543 F.2d 6, 8 n.2 (2d Cir. 1976); United States
v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 906 (9th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 155-56, 158 &
n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 462 Pa. 27, 32-33 n.1, 336 A.2d 888, 890 n.1 (Roberts
& Manderino, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975), discussing some of the
implications of judicial concern limited to ensuring that the police have efficient methods of
investigating crime.
132. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1973).
133. See note 96 supra.
134. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 462 Pa. 27, 32-33 n.1, 336 A.2d 888, 890 n.1 (Roberts
& Manderino, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
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At the same time, there are obviously circumstances falling short
of probable cause that nonetheless warrant a police response, including forcibly stopping a citizen to freeze the situation briefly.
These cases will be hard ones, especially in light of the precipitous
increase in crime today; the courts must balance fourth amendment
rights against this important societal interest. I fear, however, that
a number of recent cases decided by our appellate courts indicates
that the accommodation of societal interests in hard cases results
in weaker and weaker restraints on executive behavior. It may well
be that the delicate balance Terry struck between these interests is
simply too delicate, and too susceptible to the "hydraulic pressures"
of the times.'3
IV.

CONCLUSION

Police power exercised without probable cause is, to a large extent, arbitrarily exercised. We must keep this in mind when our
courts give imprimatur to the power to forcibly stop citizens based
on the more lenient "reasonable suspicion" test. The reasonable
suspicion test unquestionably places severe strains on the fourth
amendment's underlying policy: to strictly confine police intrusions
into the personal privacy of individuals likely to be involved in
criminal conduct. The test perforce will allow the police to interfere
with the freedom of a greater number of law-abiding citizens whose
only vulnerability may be that they look or dress peculiarly, act in
some unusual way, like to go out late at night, or happen to live in
a purported high crime area.
If, in the future, this less-than-probable-cause standard is to provide any meaningful restraint on executive behavior, our courts
must articulate reasonably definite standards for effectuating a forcible stop, and vigorously review the application of the those standards. Finally, courts must also keep in mind that there is more at
stake than the needs or convenience of law enforcement forces.
What Justice Stewart said five years ago, speaking for a majority
of the United States Supreme Court, bears repeating here. "The
needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of
official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures
135.

See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 162 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards."'",
Terry's recognition of the power of police to stop and sometimes

search citizens on less than probable cause could not help but exacerbate that tension. Hopefully, future Pennsylvania decisions addressing the permissible scope of forcible police-citizen encounters
will reflect a firm intent to protect the fundamental notions embod-

ied in the fourth amendment, values which Terry unavoidably
placed in even greater need of that protection.
136. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973). See also Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).

